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States under UNCLOS III: No
Special Treatment for Hawaii
By NANCY BARRON
Member of the Class of 1981.
I. INTRODUCTION
More than a decade of negotiations among 158 nations has
produced a treaty concerning the law of the sea of unprecedented
scope and complexity.1 Responding to the mandate of United Na-
tions Resolution 3067 "to adopt a convention dealing with all mat-
ters relating to the law of the sea . . . bearing in mind that the
problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be
considered as a whole," 2 delegates decided to negotiate by consen-
sus.' Inherent in this process is the danger of resulting unclarity, as
where consensus on a particular issue represents a tenuous major-
ity, or where consensus on the language reflects differing construc-
tions of material terms. One such area of consensual difficulty is
the boundary status of archipelagos and archipelagic states, the
subject matter of this Note.
Traditionally, political dominion terminated at the shoreline.
In recent history, customary international law has evolved the
three mile territorial sea.' The UNCLOS III Treaty revolutionizes
1. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Informal Composite Nego-
tiating Text [hereinafter cited as UNCLOS Ill and ICNT respectively], 8 UNCLOS III
(116th mtg.) 1, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/W.C. 10/Rev. 1 (1979). Not all 158 states took part in
all sessions.
2. The so-called "gentlemen's agreement" was approved by the General Assembly at its
2169th meeting on November 16, 1973, printed in 1 UNCLOS I (1st mtg.) vii, U.N. Doc.
A/CoNF. 62/Z/1 (1974).
3. For discussion of treaty-making by consensus at UNCLOS III, see generally
Jaenicke, Die Dritte Seerechtskonferenz der Vereinten Nationen: Grundprobleme im
Ueberblick, 38 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLXNDISCHES CIFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERREcHT 438,
445-52 (1978).
4. Borgese, Introduction, PACEM IN MARmUS 18 (E. Borgese ed. 1972). In his landmark
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this encroachment of national coastal control over the interna-
tional domain of ocean space by the institution of expanded mari-
time zones. 5 Accordingly, states with lengthy coastlines are protec-
tive of their newfound geopolitical advantage. The more than
500,000 islands of the world epitomize this concept insofar as they
acquire territorial gain disproportionate to their minimal land
mass., Clusters of islands present special problems, leading one
commentator to note that "[t]he archipelago doctrine ... is the
difficult case which exposes the inadequacies of existing rules."'7
Where conceptual interaction between land and sea is at a maxi-
mum, archipelagos magnify a general weakness in the attempt of
UNCLOS III to identify a jurisdictional margin between land and
sea, and in particular, to reconcile opposing interests of maritime
powers and coastal states.
The archipelagic state provisions found their present form at
the Caracas session of UNCLOS III in 1974. While no country
voiced dissent to the criteria defining an "archipelago," there was
considerable difference of opinion expressed on the narrower term
"archipelagic state."8 An archipelago may comprise a sovereign in-
dependent entity, or a territorial entity governed by a continental
state. In either case, it is a single political unit.9 While definitional
consensus was lacking at the Caracas session,10 it was nonetheless
decided that special status would be limited to "archipelagic
states.""
"Special status" refers to a method of delimiting seaward
essay Mare Liberum (1609) Grotius espoused the concept of freedom of the seas. In con-
trast, Bijnkershoek's De Dominion Maris (1702) argued for a territorial sea extending one
marine league (i.e., three miles) from shore.
5. Maritime zones are defined in terms of miles from shore. A coastal state may desig-
nate a territorial sea of twelve miles, a contiguous zone of twenty miles, and an exclusive
economic zone of two hundred miles from shore. ICNT, supra note 1, pts. 2, 5.
6. B. DUBNER, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS OF MID-OCEAN ARCHIPELAGOS &
ARCHIPELAGIC STATES 1 (1976).
7. O'Connell, Mid-Ocean Archipelagos in International Law, 45 BRaIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1,
75 (1971).
8. Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 2
UNCLOS III (36-37 mtgs.) 260-73, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/Z/1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Official Records].
9. B. DUBNER, supra note 6, at 20-22.
10. See notes 38-52 and the accompanying text, infra.
11. Official Records, supra note 8, at 260-83. For discussion of various nations' criticism
of the proposed articles leading up to the Caracas debates, see generally R. PLATZOEDER &




boundaries. By use of the "straight baseline" method, an archipe-
lagic state measures maritime zones outward from a perimeter
drawn from the outermost points of the outermost islands.12 The
area within this perimeter is designated "archipelagic waters"
under sovereign control of the archipelagic state." Thus, special
status confers upon the archipelagic state the right to acquire large
tracts of ocean surface over which it may exert jurisdictional dam-
age control. Naturally, archipelagos prefer to define themselves
within the meaning of "archipelagic state." Since many archipela-
gos are in the process of transition from colonial status to complete
autonomy, emerging state practice indicates that something less
than traditional notions of sovereignty may be sufficient to qualify
them for special status."
This question of whether an archipelago qualifies for special
status directs inquiry towards a number of issues. At what point in
the process of political independence does an archipelago become
an archipelagic state? Assuming that point in political time is de-
terminable, why should the rationale for granting special status to
archipelagic states not also apply to archipelagos? What counter-
vailing policies justify the distinction? There are no simple answers
to these questions, and indeed, delegates to UNCLOS III were not
in perfect accord.' 5
The United States finds itself in an ambivalent position. On
the one hand, it is a major maritime power, yet on the other, an
integral portion of its territory constitutes a mid-ocean archipel-
ago."6 Although the United States might have argued against polit-
ical distinctions narrowing the archipelago rule in favor of a rule
which would have included Hawaii as a mid-ocean archipelago
within the protective scope of special status, national maritime
policy favoring global mobility and freedom of the seas presented a
12. ICNT, supra note 1, art. 47 states that "[a]n archipelagic state may draw straight
archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands."
13. Id. art. 49(1): "The sovereignty of an archipelagic state extends to the waters en-
closed by the baselines, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or dis-
tance from the coast."
14. See generally Krueger & Nordquist, The Evolution of the 200-Mile Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone: State Practice in the Pacific Basin, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 321 (1979).
15. Official Records, supra note 8, at 260-73.
16. For example, Hawaii is a mid-ocean archipelago. Consensual negotiating strategy
requires consideration of the United States position as a dual coastal nation gaining acces-
sion to its Atlantic and Pacific shores, and also as a technological giant with unparalleled,
ability to exploit natural resources. The State Department may have been concerned that
stretching the limit on every issue might appear "grasping."
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strong argument for the competing view.17 To understand fully our
government's stance in not arguing for maximum territorial exten-
sion for all mid-ocean archipelagos, we must factor into the forego-
ing substantive considerations the procedural predicate of this con-
ference, namely consensus.18 The treaty was seen as a total
package, a comprehensive ocean policy. To this end, conciliation
on many points was imperative to achieve desired consensus on the
whole.'9
This Note focuses on the archipelagic state issue, using Ha-
waii as an example of the distinctions between an archipelago and
a mere group of separate islands; and, further, the distinction be-
tween an archipelago and archipelagic state.20
II. HISTORY OF THE ARCHIPELAGIC REGIME
The concept of an archipelagic regime is a relatively recent de-
velopment in Law of the Sea negotiations. Textwriters have at-
tempted to trace origins of the concept back to the early conven-
tions, beginning with the 1930 Hague Conference, but without
much success.21
Norwegian jurist and scholar Jens Evensen was the first legal
writer to give well-reasoned consideration to the mid-ocean archi-
pelago as a single unit, arguing as early as 1957 that archipelagos
isolated in mid-ocean merit a separate scheme of territorial wa-
ters.22 Taking up where Evensen left off, the 1974 UNCLOS III
treaty drafting sessions in Caracas initiated serious discussion of
such a scheme.23 Until that time, existing treaty law in the 1958
17. See generally Richardson, United States Interests and the Law of the Sea, 10 LAw.
OF THE AMERICAS, U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 651 (1978); E. RICHARDSON, LAW OF THE SEA: A TEST
FOR THE UNITED NATIONS (United States Dep't of State, Current Policy Series, Pub. No. 60,
1979).
18. Jaenicke, supra note 3, at 453.
19. Malone, U.S. Policy and the Law of the Sea, 81 DEP'T STATE BULL. 48 (July, 1981).
The major industrial and maritime powers invoked consensus over voting as a procedural
method because they feared the so-called "Group of 77" developing countries would form a
majority coalition to defeat their interests. Jaenicke, supra note 3, at 446.
20. ICNT, supra note 1, art. 46.
21. B. DUBNER, supra note 6, at 28-52. See also Amerasinghe, The Problem of Archipel-
agos in the International Law of the Sea, 23 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 539, 540-43 (1974).
22. Evensen, Certain Legal Aspects Concerning the Delimitation of the Territorial
Waters of Archipelagos, First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 13/18, Prep. Doc. No. 15 (1957).
23. Official Records, supra note 8, at 371.
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Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,24
and in the Geneva Convention on the High Seas,25 gave special
treatment only to island chains which followed the contour of a
continental coastline. These sessions sought to extend special
treatment to independent islands lying well offshore, completely
surrounded by high seas."
Case law on the matter pre-dates the 1958 conventions. In
1951, the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) decided the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case which involved foreign fishing rights in
the interstitial waters of the island-studded coastline of Norway.27
The I.C.J. reasoned that special treatment should be given to geo-
political and economic interests peculiar to a region wherein sea
and land intertwine in a complex fashion. 8 The Court went on to
lay out the criteria to be applied in considering boundaries enclos-
ing insular waters. These criteria were incorporated into article 4
of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone29 and later into the archipelagic state clauses of the ICNT.30
However, because of the unique historical and geographical cir-
cumstances of the Norwegian case, the holding did not solve diffi-
cult definitional distinctions. The set of islands involved was not a
separate legal, juridical, or political entity, but rather an integral
part of Norway. Moreover, those islands formed an extension of
the continental coast, not a mid-ocean constellation of islands.
The extent to which the rationale and result of the Norwegian
Fisheries Case would extend to offshore archipelagos under UN-
CLOS III was unclear. The archipelagic state distinction was
thought inadequate by many. Commentators remarked upon the
fact that since both archipelagic states and non-archipelagic states
were using the term "archipelagic state", a definition of the term
24. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 27, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
25. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 28, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82.
26. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 24, art. 49
states that "[fln localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a
fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines
joining appropriate points may be employed . . .such baselines must not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast. .. ."
27. Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway) [1951] I.C.J. 116.
28. Id. at 133.
29. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 24, art. 4.
30. ICNT, supra note 1, pt. IV.
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did not solve the problem of delimitation.3 1 In fact, this concern
lingered on through Caracas in 1974, at which time the current
language was adopted (by questionable concensus according to the
record) into the treaty draft.3 2 While wording of the text is -now
fixed, it still merits clarification. Two years after the present draft
was completed, one seasoned writer on the subject found that con-
sensus had not been arrived at for any particular system of delim-
iting the bounds of authority over the waters of mid-ocean archipe-
lagic islands. There is, therefore, no relevant rule on the nature of
mid-ocean archipelagic waters.3
One reason for the confusion lies in disadvantages of the
treaty-making method itself. Consensus tends to represent the ab-
sence of expressed disagreement rather than an affirmative state-
ment of accord.
Another reason for the confusion lies in fluctuating political
situations common to many mid-ocean archipelagos. Neither
Evensen, nor the Conventions of 1958, addressed this problem be-
cause at that point in time the distinction was largely premature.
Colonial rule was prevalent until the mid-sixties and seventies,
when many islands in Oceania and elsewhere gained independence
and quickly found influential international voices.3" Fiji, for exam-
ple, which under British rule was given no special treatment as a
single unit with juridical control over inter-island waters," became
one of the drafting nations of the present provisions.3 6 As the
decolonization trend continues and until it reaches political equi-
librium, there shall exist great variations in the degree of auton-
omy among island groups.
III. DEFINITIONS OF "ARCHIPELAGO" AND
"ARCHIPELAGIC STATE"
Article 46(b) of the ICNT sets out guidelines by which a group
of islands may claim to be an archipelago.
"Archipelago" means a group of islands, including parts of is-
lands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which
are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other nat-
31. See M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS (1962).
32. ICNT, supra note 1, pt. IV.
33. B. DUBNER, supra note 6, at 41.
34. See generally Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 14, at 321.
35. Amerasinghe, supra note 21, at 544.
36. U.N. Doc. A/AC 138 SC II/L. 48 (1973).
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ural features, form an intrinsic geographical, economic and politi-
cal entity, or which historically have been regarded as such.37
This definition has not proved troublesome, because the geographi-
cal, political, economic and historical factors38 applied as a balanc-
ing test determine whether, as a practical matter, the islands and
inter-island waters are best viewed as a whole.
Nevertheless, not every archipelago is an archipelagic state. 9
The issue is one of sovereignty. Rigidly defined, a state is "one
body politic exercising independent sovereignty and control over
all persons and things within its boundaries, capable of making
war and peace and of entering into international relations". 40 The
State of Hawaii, for example, is not a state in the international
sense. It exercises a certain territorial sovereignty, but is incapable
of asserting itself in foreign affairs and national boundary limita-
tions preempt the state's own territorial claims.
Hawaii is not alone in the Pacific in this respect; it merely rep-
resents one extreme end of a spectrum of dependent-independent
states vis-h-vis a continental state. Degrees of sovereignty vary.
Mid-ocean archipelagos have status ranging from a nation state
(Indonesia), a United Nations trust (Pacific Trust Territory of Mi-
cronesia),41 a colonial territory (French Polynesia),42 to a national
park (Galapagos Islands of the Colon Archipelago). 4 This nomen-
clature is more political than geographical and represents a sliding
scale of territorial sovereignty determined by domestic standards.
Thus, to give one category special international treatment while
denying such to another evidences an arbitrary preference for one
internal distinction over another. Nonetheless, the attempt of a
few states to raise their island colonies to the status of archipelagos
for purposes of straight baseline boundaries met with little success
at UNCLOS I1. 44
37. ICNT, supra note 1, art. 46(b).
38. In the Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway) [1951] I.C.J. 116, the court held
that a state must be allowed the latitude necessary to adapt its delimitation to practical
needs and local requirements. The notion of straight baselines was predicated on an inti-
mate and inseparable relationship between the land and sea domain.
39. ICNT, supra note 1, art. 46(a) defines any archipelagic state as one "constituted
wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands ... "
40. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1262 (5th ed. 1979).
41. Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 14, at 360.
42. Id. at 340.
43. Official Records, supra note 8, at 267.
44. Jaenicke, supra note 3, at 477.
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A. Drafting the Language of the Treaty
During the 1974 drafting meetings in Caracas, most delega-
tions expressed a need for clearer definition of an "archipelagic
state. '45 The different drafts, which had been tabled at previous
sessions, were discussed.46
The first draft defined an archipelagic state as one consisting
"wholly or mainly" of one or more archipelagos, adding "A coastal
state with one or more off-lying archipelagos," may employ the
method of straight baselines and enjoy the sovereignty and rights
of an archipelagic state.4 The subsequent draft articles submitted
by the four representative archipelagic states deleted "or mainly"
from the previous draft.4" Apparently, the four-nation committee
proposing the draft intended to exclude those archipelagos politi-
cally appended to a continental state. Nonetheless, consensus of
the entire forum on this issue was clearly lacking.
A careful reading of each country's statement produces the
following tally: Of thirty-two nations, only twelve expressly main-
tained that the definition should exclude offshore archipelagos be-
longing to a coastal state. Eleven countries expressly stated that an
archipelagic state regime should include archipelagos which form
an integral part of a single coastal state, even though the archipel-
ago is not an independent sovereign.49 To these latter, Greece"
and Colombia51 added their vote elsewhere in the proceedings,
bringing the number favoring a liberal construction of "archipe-
lagic state" to thirteen nations. Nine states expressed no prefer-
45. ICNT, supra note 1, Art. 46(a).
46. A third draft, proposed by the United Kingdom as the purported representative of
the maritime powers, was not discussed. For an analysis of this rejected proposal, see Amer-
asinghe, supra note 21, at 540-43.
47. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/C. 2/L. 49 (1973).
48. Official Records, supra note 8, at 260.
49. Id. at 260-73.
50. In his opening remarks to the Caracas Conference, Mr. Theodoropoulos, represent-
ing the Greek delegation, said that the fact that islands formed an intrinsic geographical
unit had led to widespread recognition of the right to draw straight baselines and unite
closely linked islands, irrespective of whether an archipelago was part of a state also possess-
ing a continental territory or formed a state itself. Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, Official Records, 1 UNCLOS III (32nd mtg.) 129, U. N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/Z/1
(1974).
51. Mr. Gori, speaking for Colombia, asserted that since an archipelagic state could
claim a special regime, by the same token a coastal state which exercised sovereignty over
one or more archipelagos could claim an equivalent regime for those archipelagos. Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, 2 UNCLOS III (39th
mtg.) 280, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/Z/1 (1974).
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ence in their appraisal of the articles. The United States did not
formally voice its view at these meetings.
Only a narrow construction would assuage the maritime pow-
ers' worry, articulated by Japan, that "as a result of a vague defini-
tion of an archipelago, there was to be a proliferation of claims." '52
On the other hand, Portugal pointed out that "arguments in
favor of the establishment of a special regime for archipelagic
States were also valid for archipelagos forming part of the territory
of a coastal State, particularly with regard to the security and eco-
nomic interests of such States. '5 3 India noted "the archipelagic
State concept recognized the geographical, economic and political
unity of the archipelagos constituting a single State... (and) ac-
knowledged the right of a coastal State having archipelagos which
formed an integral part of its territory to apply the principles ap-
plicable to archipelagic States . . .
Outspoken Ecuador was the first continental country to assert
archipelagic "special status" in the case of its famed Galapagos Is-
lands comprising the Colon Archipelago. Supporting the French
view concerning the indivisibility of sovereignty, the Ecuadorian
delegation asserted that "[s]ince its independence, Ecuador has ex-
ercised sovereignty over that group of islands: they were part of a
single geographical, economic and political entity and had always
been regarded as such."5 5 France had argued earlier against pro-
posals "aimed at establishing a distinction between the sovereignty
exercised by the State over islands and that exercised over parts of
a continent. Such an approach would be a legal monstrosity be-
cause it would lead to a division of the sovereingty of the State."58
Honduras concurred. By designating the Islas de las Bahias a "de-
partment," Honduras gave that group of islands the highest possi-
ble legal status, and an acknowledgement of their geographical, po-
litical and economic relationship with the mainland.57
This legislative history of international lawmaking reveals a
persistent uncertainty as to a final, firm definition of "archipelagic
state," an element essential to the application of Part IV of the
ICNT. 5 Varying degrees of dominance asserted by continental
52. Official Records, supra note 8, at 261.
53. Id. at 266.
54. Id. at 263.
55. Id. at 267.
56. Id. at 263.
57. Id.
58. ICNT, supra note 1, pt. IV.
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governments are as troublesome as the varying degrees of sover-
eignty asserted by the island groups themselves.
B. Abstract of the Archipelagic State Clauses
The sum and substance of the archipelagic state clauses is that
the archipelago may measure its maritime boundaries from
straight, rather than normal, baselines, where the criteria of article
46 are met.59 "Straight" baselines result in a single perimeter
drawn around the outermost points of the group as a whole, en-
closing all waters and other islands within. "Normal" baselines
draw a low-tide perimeter around each island individually. 0
Seas enclosed by straight baselines are archipelagic waters. All
other maritime zones extend outward from the baseline,61 rather
than from the shoreline. Whereas the Territorial Sea extends to a
maximum of twelve miles from shore,62 the Contiguous Zone, a
maximum of twenty-four miles,6 3 and the Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ), up to two hundred miles,64 there is no designated mile
limit on the area of archipelagic waters.6 5
Above archipelagic waters the coastal state has sovereignty
over the airspace (overflight).66 Beneath archipelagic waters it en-
joys exclusive rights to the resources of the seabed and subsoil.6 7
The coastal state has control over domestic and foreign navigation
in the channels between islands, including the right to temporarily
suspend innocent passage.6 8 Likewise article 52 provides: "The
archipelagic State may, without discrimination in form or in fact
amongst foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its
archipelagic waters the innocent passage of foreign ships if such
suspension is essential for the protection of its security". 6
To understand the advantage of "special status 7 0 for archipe-
lagic states, it is helpful to contrast the rights attaching to archipe-
59. Id. arts. 46-47.
60. Id. art. 5.
61. Id. art. 48.
62. Id. art. 3.
63. Id. art. 33(2).
64. Id. art. 57.
65. Id. art. 47.
66. Id. art. 49(2).
67. Id.
68. Id. art. 52(1).
69. Id. art. 52(2).
70. See notes 76-83 and accompanying text, infra.
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lagic waters with those characteristic of other maritime zones, par-
ticularly the Territorial Sea and the Exclusive Economic Zone.
With respect to rights of passage, rules concerning the Territo-
rial Sea are similar to those concerning archipelagic waters, except
that the latter comprise a more precise scheme for designation of
sea lanes and traffic separation patterns, 1 while providing mea-
sures against ships' deviation from such sea lanes. 2 Comparable to
the control of a coastal state over its Territorial Sea, the island
state has considerable discretion in navigational safety control in
these sea lanes, provided it conforms to customary norms of inter-
national navigation.
By comparison, the designation of an area as an Exclusive Ec-
onomic Zone gives considerably less control to the coastal state
than that attaching to archipelagic states. The text of the treaty,
Part V, grants "[s]overeign rights for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources,
whether living or nonliving, of the seabed and subsoil and the su-
perjacent waters. . . .,s In the EEZ, however, foreign states enjoy
the freedoms "of navigation and overflight and of the laying of
submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful
uses of the sea. . . . "7 The foregoing are implicit in traditional
notions of freedom of the High Seas.
In sum, like the EEZ, an archipelagic waters model favors eco-
nomic interests of the island state; but unlike the EEZ it favors
security interests of the island state over navigational concerns of
the maritime powers. The EEZ may be as much as a two hundred
mile radius; thus, in any archipelago,7 5 the EEZs of any archipel-
ago's individual islands overlap even if drawn from normal base-
lines. Therefore, it is the control over inter-island navigation
rather than an exclusive right to exploit resources which distin-
guishes the archipelagic state from other political designations.
1. Effect of Special Status
The concept of special treatment for island groups76 was
71. ICNT, supra note 1, art. 53.
72. Id. art. 53(5).
73. Id. art. 56(1)(a).
74. Id. art. 58.
75. Id. art. 46.
76. Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway) [1951] I.C.J. 116. See generally Hodg-
son & Smith, The Informal Single Negotiating Text (Committee II): A Geographical Per-
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spawned by the economic interests peculiar to archipelagos. How-
ever, at the Caracas meeting which drafted these articles there was
an articulated emphasis upon the political, strategic and security
concerns of archipelagic states arising from their vulnerability to
isolation and partition in case of attack.77 In peacetime the pendu-
lum is apt to swing toward economic concerns, i.e., energy, fishing
rights, and other resources. The stance of each nation must be in-
terpreted against the background of its own self-interest.78
The protection of both economic and security interests is ef-
fected by coastal state control over archipelagic waters, particu-
larly inter-island channels. Straight baselines, providing continuity
from island to island establish corridors of coastal control across
ocean channels. Such control is necessary to guarantee the prudent
long-term use of ocean resources. This has been a concern of the
United States since President Truman issued a Presidential Proc-
lamation in 1945 asserting the United States' control over its own
continental shelf.7 9 Commentators observed:
The effectiveness of measures to utilize or conserve these re-
sources would be contingent upon cooperation and protection
from the shore ... self-protection compels the coastal nation to
keep close watch over activities off its shores which are of the
nature necessary for utilization of these resources .... 80
As inter-island traffic increases, the ability to explore, exploit,
and protect natural resources becomes difficult without the concur-
rent ability to regulate navigational patterns in a reasonable man-
ner. To this end the increased control afforded by straight base-
lines is far superior. The archipelagic state has the right to
designate sea lanes and separation schemes for maritime traffic.,
Another significant effect of giving an archipelagic state spe-
cial status to define its boundaries by straight baselines lies in the
area of national security. "[W]arships on the High Seas have com-
plete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the
flag State" of the vessel itself.8 2 The three mile limit is tradition-
ally premised on the "cannon ball rule," the distance of a typical
spective, 3 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND INT'L L.J. 225 (1976).
77. Official Records, supra note 11, at 260-73.
78. See generally Hodgson & Smith, supra note 76.
79. Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 Compilation).
80. Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 14, at 321.
81. ICNT, supra note 1, art. 53.
82. Id. art. 95.
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18th Century weapon trajectory. Obviously the rule is obsolete.
Nevertheless, the underlying security interest is not to be ignored
in modern analysis.
An archipelagic state can suspend innocent passage 83 for good
cause. Such measures, which ease the island state's task of defense
and surveillance, are afforded an archipelagic state precisely be-
cause of its inherent vulnerability in terms of national security.
Absent special status, island groups cannot do so unless their
twelve mile Territorial Seas overlap.
Thus, archipelagic state status confers two basic advantages:
(1) in terms of economic interests it provides protection of natural
resources, and (2) in terms of political interests, it provides protec-
tion of national security interests.
The potential for abuse of restrictive rights is strong. The ef-
fect of a proliferation of claims would be to balkanize the world's
oceans so as to erect an obstacle course for maritime routes. Both
warships and merchant marine might have to confront adjoining
blocks of archipelagic waters. Thus, it is a small wonder that mari-
time powers uniformly discourage such creeping territorial
aggrandizement.
2. Conflicting Interests of Maritime Powers and Archipelagic States
Special treatment for archipelagos threatens the interests of
the major maritime and global military powers. C.F. Amerasinghe,
former President of UNCLOS, recognized these differences, and in
a thoughtful and comprehensive article he urged compromise:
The countervailing interests of other States, particularly mari-
time States, in the seas within and surrounding archipelagos can-
not be ignored in approaching the problem of archipelagos. Other
States have inclusive claims based on the security need in seeing
that large areas of ocean and airspace are not closed to shipping
and aircraft. Such maritime powers as the U.S.A. have a special
interest in this kind of claim. Equally, other States have commer-
cial interests for their merchant vessels and aircraft on the high
seas. Both these interests involve the freedom of navigation, un-
hampered transportation and communication, whether surface,
subsurface or aerial.84
Early assertions of special status advanced by Indonesia, the Phil-
83. Id. art. 52(2).
84. Amerasinghe, supra note 21, at 558.
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ippines, and Ecuador met with protest from the maritime states, of
which the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR,
were most vocal.3 5
Ambassador Elliot Richardson, head of the United States del-
egation to UNCLOS III, expressed this opposition most clearly in
terms of commerce and national security:
Ninety percent of US international trade is carried on the oceans
.... Protection of freedom of navigation for tankers and other
commercial vessels is extremely important. Since our Armed
Forces operate on a worldwide basis, the United States has a
compelling interest in assuring global mobility and freedom to use
the seas and the airspace above them for national security pur-
poses. Most, but not all, countries recognize that our security in-
terests and those of other major powers must be satisfied if there
is to be general agreement on a treaty."6
In particular, the restriction of passage through the seas surround-
ing the islands of Indonesia and the Philippines would make access
between the Pacific and Indian Oceans more difficult and costly.
7
At the Caracas meetings, the archipelagic states responsible
for drafting the relevant treaty provisions argued persuasively that
their own national security depends on control of inter-island
waters.88
It is the inadequate reconciliation of these conflicting inter-
ests-maritime mobility versus insular control-that has led to the
definitional difficulties in the archipelagic state clauses. In drafting
a rule to cover geographical claims, no two of which are identical,
each state sought to define archipelagic state as narrowly as possi-
ble, yet just broadly enough to include itself. Each interpreted the
final language consistent with its own self interest.
IV. THE UNITED STATES POSITION
PERTAINING TO HAWAII
The United states has not attempted to argue that the Hawai-
ian Islands' minimal autonomy as a state of the Union might give
it archipelagic state status. It would be contrary to national policy
to strain the treaty language which the concept of mare liberum
85. Id. at 544.
86. Richardson, United States Interests and the Law of the Sea, supra note 17, at 656.
87. Amerasinghe, supra note 21, at 559.
88. Official Records, supra note 8, at 264.
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would favor narrowing. The State Department has consistently
maintained its position against further balkanization of the world
oceans, preferring to deny archipelagos special status insofar as
any grant of jurisdiction would further encroach upon freedom of
the High Seas.
The debate is not new. In 1951, in remonstrative response to
Ecuador's declaration of archipelagic boundaries for the Galapagos
Islands, the State Department released this statement:
The United States has, in common with the great majority of
other maritime nations long adhered to the principle that the belt
of territorial waters extends three marine miles from the coasts.
This principle, when applied to insular possessions, contemplates
a separate belt of territorial waters for each island, excepting
where the water distance is less than six marine miles. Both the
purported establishment of a belt of Ecuadorian territorial waters
twelve nautical miles in breadth, and the assertion of a claim to a
single belt of territorial waters around the entire Colon Archipel-
ago, contravene this principle of international law. 9
Thirty years later, that premise of customary internationaf law
may be superseded by treaty, where an archipelago can identify
itself under the rubric of archipelagic state. Ecuador has made it
clear that it intends to do just that vis-a-vis the Galapagos Island
of Colon. 90
In spite of the State Department's strict stance against special
archipelagic boundaries for the Hawaiian Islands, the entire archi-
pelago is surrounded by a single Fisheries Management Zone with
a 200 mile radius.9 1 Nonetheless, because none of the islands is
more than 400 miles apart, overlapping zones drawn around each
island could constitute a single unit overall. To this limited extent,
the United States, too, has contributed to mare clausum, but did
not have to resort to special archipelagic state status to do so.
A. Federal Pre-emption
The Hawaiian archipelago is one of the fifty states of the
United States. It is home for over a million Americans; primary
base for the Pacific fleet and headquarters of major military instal-
89. United States Dep't of State Note of Protest dated June 7, 1951, reprinted in B.
DUBNER, supra note 6, at 43.
90. Official Records, supra note 8, at 267.
91. Fishery Conservation & Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976).
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lations; port of call and processing center for a thriving deep water
fishing industry; recreational center for millions of travellers each
year and commercial crossroads of East-West trade. 2 Its signifi-
cance in the mid-North Pacific is undeniable.
Nonetheless, in spite of this significance, Hawaii may not as-
sert on its own behalf a more extensive claim against the High Seas
than the United States asserts for it. The Supreme Court ad-
dressed this issue in United States v. California" in determining
that the Federal Government has paramount rights to submerged
lands in the Santa Barbara Channel:
"[T]he Convention [on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone]
recognizes the validity of straight base lines used by other coun-
tries, Norway for instance, and would permit the United States to
use such base lines if it chose, but that California may not use
such base lines to extend our international boundaries beyond
their traditional international limits against the expressed opposi-
tion of the United States.94
The court reasoned that:
an extension of state sovereignty to an international area by
claiming it as inland water would necessarily also extend national
sovereignty, and unless the Federal Government's responsibility
for questions of external sovereignty is hollow, it must have the
power to prevent States from so enlarging themselves.95
United States v. Louisiana96 is similar to United States v.
California in that it concerned the Federal Government's efforts to
control offshore areas despite conflicting state claims of sover-
eignty. There, the Supreme Court clarified the separation of pow-
ers between federal and state governments as well as between
branches of the Federal Government.
The power to admit new States resides in Congress. The Presi-
dent, on the other hand, is the constitutional representative of
the United States in its dealings with foreign nations. From the
former springs the power to establish state boundaries; from the
latter comes the power to determine how far this country will
claim territorial rights in the marginal sea as against other na-
92. G. DAWES & E. SHEEHAN, THE HAWAIIANS (1970).
93. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1964).
94. Id. at 167-68 (emphasis in original).
95. Id. at 168.
96. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1959).
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tions. Any such determination is, of course, binding on the
States. 7
On the other hand, "the national responsibility for conducting
our international relations obviously must be accommodated with
the legitimate interests of the States in the territory over which
they are sovereign. Thus, a contraction of a State's recognized ter-
ritory imposed by the Federal Government in the name of foreign
policy would be highly questionable." 98
Hawaiian case law holds that there is no historic claim to the
channels.9 9 Thus, the Federal Government's determination of in-
ternational boundaries limits Hawaiian state claims by the doc-
trine of federal pre-emption.
V. THE HAWAIIAN ARCHIPELAGO
Were Hawaii an independent, sovereign state, it would un-
doubtedly prefer to assert archipelagic state status to obtain the
advantages of an increased maritime zone area and increased con-
trol over inter-island channels. As it is instead a mere political ap-
pendage to a continental nation, a narrow construction of
"archipelagic state" would not include Hawaii. Indeed, similar
claims by Spain and India vis-a-vis their offshore territories have
not been accepted by the international community.100
Definitional analysis of "archipelagic state" has two compo-
nents. We have concluded Hawaii is not an archipelagic state. But,
is it even an archipelago under the terms of the treaty at hand?
The answer to this question brings into focus the uniqueness
of this geopolitical division, and permits elucidation of the logic for
conferring special treatment in the first place.
The islands and inter-island waters of an archipelago must
"form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or
historically have been regarded as such." 101 A four-point test de-
rived from the reasoning of the Fisheries Case02 is used to deter-
mine intimate interaction of land and sea.
97. Id. at 35.
98. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 168 (1964). Courts consider "historic
rights" to determine recognized territory. See text accompanying notes 130-46, infra.
99. C.A.B. v. Island Airlines, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 990, 999 (D. Hawaii 1964), aff'd, 352
F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1965).
100. Jaenicke, supra note 3, at 477.
101. ICNT, supra note 1, art. 46(b).
102. Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway) [1951] I.C.J. 116, 133.
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The rationale behind special treatment for islands which form
a single political group is based on the integrity of the body as a
whole. The four point test sets out the following criteria: (1) Eco-
nomic viability requiring cooperation, transportation, and inter-is-
land commerce; (2) political stability and security requiring con-
trol and communication; (3) cultural continuity requiring an
historical commonality advanced in part by (4) geographical prox-
imity. These are elements essential to the functioning of a group of
people as a whole.
When populations are segmented by navigable waters, a rea-
sonable degree of control over those waterways is arguably neces-
sary to the integrity of the state as a single unit.103 Therefore, even
as an island group satisfies the criteria which define it as an archi-
pelago, this result establishes from the outset the island group's
best argument for special treatment in terms of jurisdictional
boundaries granted to a state of archipelagic status.
The Hawaiian Archipelago serves as a good example to apply
the four-fold test. It illustrates that not every group of islands is an
archipelago for international purposes, and the distinguishing fea-
tures point out the purpose of granting special status to true archi-
pelagos. The eight most familiar islands-Oahu, Kauai, Maui, Nii-
hau, Lanai, Moloka, Kahoolawe, and the "Big Island" of
Hawaii-cover only about a third of the length of the island chain.
These are called the Main Group.
Unknown to most Americans is the fact that at least eight
other outer islands, atolls, and reefs skip like stepping stones
across 1100 nautical miles, out to Midway Island. This is the Lee-
ward Group, extending westward and slightly northward along the
Trade Wind route: Nihoa, Necker, French Frigate Shoals, Gardner
Pinnacles, Laysan, Lisianski, Pearl and Hermes Reef. The two
groups of the Hawaiian Archipelago are contrasted for purposes of
this analysis.
A. Geographical Requirements
The committee which drafted the ICNT set out limiting
guidelines which archipelagic baselines must meet. These measure-
ments also define the geographical meaning of "cohesiveness." Ar-




joining the outermost points of the outermost islands . . . pro-
vided that within such baselines are included the main islands
and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area
of the land, including atolls, is between one to one and nine to
one.20 4
Article 47(8) further clarifies this provision with the following
language:
for the purposes of computing the ratio of water to land under
paragraph 1, land areas may include waters lying within the fring-
ing reefs of islands and atolls .... 1o
Thus, inner lagoons are measured as land. This allowance for atolls
is important for thousands of otherwise insignificant islets, thin
slices of coconut palm-strewn sand scant in acreage, but' encircling
a lagoon many times the dimension of land.
The geomorphical relationship of the islands to one another
and the geographical relationship of land mass to surrounding sea
distinguish the Main Group from the Leewards.
Among the Leeward Islands, which are geologically older than
the Main Group and thus characterized by outer reefs circumscrib-
ing gigantic lagoons, land-sea ratio is minimal; French Frigate
Shoals covers 107,707 acres of shallow water, but only a total of 65
acres of terra firma; Lisianski covers 382.6 acres of land and 95,506
acres of shallow, reef-laced shoal.106 How much of this ought to be
included in "that part of a steep-sided oceanic plateau which is
enclosed or nearly enclosed by a chain of limestone islands and
drying reefs lying on the perimeter of the plateau," as required by
article 47 (8)107 is information presently unavailable. It is clear,
however, even without precise figures, the Leeward Islands do not
constitute sufficient land mass to satisfy the intimate land-sea rela-
tionship contemplated by the articles. The combined land area of
the Leewards amounts to a mere 1755.5 acres, 160 and even if this
figure were to be abundantly increased by adding lagoons and dry-
ing reefs, the fact that the island chain spans 1100 miles of open
ocean means the Leewards could not meet the nine-to-one ratio
104. ICNT, supra note 1, art. 47(1).
105. Id. art. 47(8).
106. Letter from Elizabeth Cummings, Acting Refuge Manager, United States Dep't of
the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, to the author (Oct. 10, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Cummings Letter].
107. ICNT, supra note 1, art. 47(8).
108. Cummings Letter, supra note 106.
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required by article 47(1).'09
The eight islands of the Main Group, however, consist of a
much broader land base. The "Big Island," Hawaii, is over 4000
square miles.' 10 Unlike the Leewards, which appear on the nautical
charts as mere flecks scattered across multiple meridians of open
sea, the Main Group constitutes a substantial presence. Although
figures are unavailable for the area which would be encompassed
by straight baselines, it is clear that the nine-to-one ratio is easily
met. The linear configuration of the chain and the lack of any stray
islets which would conflict with the provision that "baselines shall
not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configura-
tion of the archipelago" result in a low land-sea ratio.""
Article 47 contains a second major limitation designed to de-
termine the geomorphical cohesiveness of the island group in ques-
tion. Section (2) states:
The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles,
except that up to three percent of the total number of baselines
enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maxi-
mum length of 125 nautical miles. 1 2
While not a single pair of islands in the Leeward Chain satisfies
this provision, in contrast, every channel between the islands of
the Main Group falls within this limitation. The widest is the Ka-
uai Channel, 64 miles in width."'
Among the geographical limitations of article 47 are two fac-
tors of lesser importance which nonetheless deserve consideration.
Article 47(5) states:
The system of such baselines shall not be applied by an archipe-
lagic State in such a manner as to cut off from the high seas or
the exclusive economic zone the territorial sea of another State. 14
Section (7) adds that existing rights of "an immediately adjacent
neighboring State" are to be respected." 5 The entire Hawaiian ar-
109. ICNT, supra note 1, art. 47(1).
110. State of Hawaii Dep't of Accounting and General Services, Survey Division, Mem-
orandum Re: The Islands Now Included in the State of Hawaii (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Survey Division Memorandum].
111. ICNT, supra note 1, art. 47(3).
112. Id. art. 47(2).
113. C.A.B. v. Island Airlines, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 990, 993 n.6 (D. Hawaii 1964), all'd,
352 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1965); Amerasinghe, supra note 21, at 561.
114. ICNT, supra note 1, art. 47(5).
115. Id. art. 47(7).
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chipelago, including both the Leewards and the Main Group, are
so remotely situated in the middle North Pacific, sprawling along
the Tropic of Cancer between 154°W and the International
Dateline at 180 ° , that even the 200 mile fisheries zone shown on
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Chart No.
19019 neither encroaches upon the Territorial Sea of a neighboring
nation, nor brings Hawaii into conjunction with another maritime
zone of a neighboring nation.1
16
It is clear from the foregoing that the Main Group of Hawai-
ian Islands fits the geographical formula for archipelagic status.
Hawaii's substantial land-sea ratio, proximity of the islands, linear
configuration requiring little open ocean to be enclosed by base-
lines, and distinct isolation from the territorial claims of any other
nation, make this island group a perfect example of the single unit
theory which argues for the special treatment of boundary delimi-
tation under an archipelagic regime.
The Leewards, on the other hand, form too insubstantial a
representation of solid ground above sea level to meet the geo-
graphical prerequisities.
B. Political Criteria
The political question immediately divides the Hawaiian Ar-
chipelago into two sections. The eight islands of the Main Group
comprise the State of Hawaii. As a State of the Union, this insular
unit is entitled to the same rights and sovereignty as any of the
other 49 United States. Upon statehood, Hawaii attained the high-
est possible legal status-an acknowledgment of its geographical,
political, and economic relationship with the mainland.
There is a compelling argument for political integrity among
the islands of the Main Group, the State of Hawaii. Kauai, Maui,
Hawaii, Molokai, Lanai, and Niihau look to the state capitol of
Honolulu on Oahu for political leadership. An entity equal in stat-
ure and voice to the other 49 members of the Union, Hawaii is
entitled to territorial sovereignty and national security protection
of its citizens. While foreign affairs power lies with the Federal
Government, interests of the individual states most directly af-
fected by any given international proposal are factors that must be
weighed in the exercise of the treaty-making power. In the case of
Hawaii, federal and state interests in national security measures
116. N.O.A.A. Chart No. 19019.
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coincide.
By contrast, the islands identified as the Leewards have the
territorial status of federal lands; they comprise the Hawaiian Is-
lands National Wildlife Refuge. Although they do not now belong
to the State of Hawaii, they did at one time when Hawaii was
merely a possession of the United States. Former official surveyor
of the Territory of Hawaii, Robert D. King, writes: "With the ex-
ception of Midway Islands, which have always been considered as
belonging to the United States, these islands have all, from time to
time, been annexed by Hawaii, and hence became the property of
the United States with the acquisition of that territory". 117 That
acquisition occurred in 1898. Any question of jurisdiction was de-
cided and codified in Executive Order No. 1019 which President
Theodore Roosevelt signed into law February 3, 1909:
It is hereby ordered that the following islets and reefs, namely:
Cure Island, Pearl and Hermes Reef, Lysianski [sic] or Pell Is-
land, Laysan Island, Mary Reef, Dowsetts Reef, Gardiner Island,
Two Brothers Reef, French Fregate [sic] Shoal, Neckar Island,
Frost Shoal and Bird Island, situated in the Pacific Ocean at and
near the extreme western extension of the Hawaiian archipelago
... are hereby reserved and set apart, subject to valid existing
rights, for the use of the Department of Agriculture as a preserve
and breeding ground for native birds.11
Various state and federal sources disagre.e as to the inclusion of all
these islands, but do agree that at least eight are still considered
part of the National Wildlife Refuge. 119
While at various times jurisdiction over the Leeward Islands
was arguably under Hawaiian state authority, current National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration charts indicate: "The
Hawaiian Islands National Wildlife Refuge is under the jurisdic-
tion of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Inte-
117. King, Islands of Hawaii and Vicinity, HAwAI TOURFAX ANNUAL 10, 14 (1937).
118. Exec. Order No. 1019 (1909).
119. Survey Division Memorandum, supra note 110. Compare this memorandum and
Exec. Order No. 1019 (1909) with the Cummings letter, supra note 106, wherein it is noted
that:
the islets & reefs listed in the 1909 Executive Order differ somewhat from the list
in our current refuge boundaries ... Dowsetts Reef, Two Brothers Reef, & Frost
Shoal are no longer included based on U.S. Coast & Geodetic Survey Charts; &
Kure (formerly Cure Island) is now a state refuge & site of a Coast Guard Loran C
Station & no longer part of the Hawaiian Island [National Wildlife Refuge]."
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rior.' 120 It remains in federal hands, detached from any Hawaiian
state agency.
Isolated, inhospitable to human habitation, and populated
solely by breeding albatross and other endangered species,212 the
Leewards lay no claim to being a political unit of any kind. While
the Leewards currently serve no military purpose, except for a sin-
gle weather station on tiny Tern Island, 22 the potential for a string
of land bases stretching 1100 miles across the Pacific is not an in-
significant prospect for national security interests. Nevertheless, no
installation now exists.
The Main Group is another story, serving as the site for a
proliferation of military bases. While the largest concentration of
personnel is on Oahu, Koolahawe is used exclusively for military
functions, and other islands are locations for training activities.
Pearl Harbor is headquarters for the Pacific Fleet, and the west
end of Oahu is occupied by Naval Air Defense. National security
requires that inter-island channels be protected by regulation and
surveillance of foreign ships passing through them.
Discussing Hawaii's role in the security interests of the United
States, Senator Spark Matsunaga recently stated that he had no
doubt that:
an attack on California would have been attempted later in the
war (WWH) if the United States had not been able to regroup
and launch a counter-attack from Hawaii. The USS Arizona me-
morial at Pearl Harbor is a constant reminder of the important
role which Hawaii played in the defense of this country during
World War II, and of the importance of maintaining our presence
in the Pacific.123
C. Economic Concerns
The economic factor involves requirements of human habita-
tion, exploitation of non-living resources, commerce, conservation,
and controlled harvesting of living resources. 24
Formerly, the economic question focused on resource exploita-
tion required for the sustenance and welfare of the local inhabi-
120. N.O.A.A. Chart Nos. 19004, 19016, 19019, 19022, 19401, 19402, 19421, 19441,
19442, 19461, 19481, 19483.
121. Gaffney, The "Other" Hawaiian Islands, SEA MAGAZINE, August 1979, at 52, 53.
122. Cummings Letter, supra note 106.
123. San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 17, 1980, at 6, col. 1.
124. Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway) [1951] I.C.J. 116.
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tants. Some developing countries still limit their argument for spe-
cial status to this self-sufficiency point. The modern reality for
most nations, however, is that oceanic land bases are an important
source of energy and mineral resources, and hold potential for the
exploitation of other resources yet to be fully developed.
Under the regime of islands, designated in article 121(3),
"rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of
their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf.1125 This is not to say that uninhabited islands may not form
a part of an archipelago; they often do. Micronesia, for example,
"comprises a series of small islands which, due to poor soil and
lack of mineral resources, do not have a viable economic land
base. ' 126 A similar situation prevails in French Polynesia, where
baselines touch atolls consisting solely of sand which are com-
pletely submerged during hurricanes. The deciding factor is that
the archipelago as a whole must offer a viable economy supporting,
at least in part, a local population.
The Leeward Islands of Hawaii fail the test, because there is
no indigenous population. In 1979, the United States Department
of the Interior reported that only one of the Rogue Islands is in-
habited permanently at this time; Tern Island, one of the small
sandy islands included in French Frigate Shoals, is the residence of
a Refuge manager and site of a former Coast Guard Loran A sta-
tion. These facilities also are occasionally used by researchers.127
To the extent that the Leewards comprise a National Wildlife
Refuge, ecological preservation arguably constitutes a viable eco-
nomic interest in protecting surrounding waters. However, the
United States Supreme Court rejected this argument in the case of
United States v. Alaska.1 28 In that instance, the Court found that
an environmental interest in protecting wildlife preserves was in-
sufficient to declare Cook Inlet as internal waters. Similarly, the
economic interests of the Leeward Islands would likely be found
insufficient to compel a finding that this group could declare
archipelagic waters.
Again, the Main Group presents an entirely different picture.
The eight islands sustain a substantial population. Honolulu is the
125. ICNT, supra note 1, art. 121.
126. Alexander & Hodgson, The Impact of the 200-Mile Economic Zone and the Law
of the Sea, 12 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 574 (1975).
127. Cummings Letter, supra note 106.
128. United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184 (1975).
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most important mid-ocean port in the Pacific. It is the location of
an international airport. It is the crossroads of commercial activity
between East and West. It connects Japan and China with United
States trade. Moreover, inter-island transport across the channels
is absolutely essential to the state economy. The waters are gener-
ously harvested for local consumption, shipment to the mainland
and international export. Relatively small native fishing vessels, as
well as the behemoths of the tuna fleet, ply the channel waters in
search of schools of ahu, ono, mahimahi and a myriad of other va-
rieties of fish. Since the days when Lahaina, Maui, was every Pa-
cific whaler's port of call, the economy of these islands has been
intimately entwined with the living resources of the sea.
The commercial cohesiveness of this archipelago is firmly es-
tablished. From the outer islands to the port of Honolulu on Oahu
or to the port of Hilo on Hawaii, all goods and produce must be
shipped by boat, barge, or air for refining, processing, manufactur-
ing, packaging, and further shipment. Likewise most necessities are
shipped to one of the major ports before distribution by inter-is-
land transport. In this sense the islands of the State of Hawaii are
totally dependent on one another, totally dependent on open chan-
nels of communication and commercial interaction between them-
selves. Hawaii has a very strong economic interest in protective
rights of navigation and regulation of shipping in the channels of
water severing the eight islands of the Main Group. This is better
served by drawing straight baselines, rather than by measuring ter-
ritorial seas around each island independently.
The State of Hawaii illustrates the degree to which economic
needs of mid-ocean archipelagos are met only by effective inter-
island interaction, regardless of their political integration with the
government of a continental state.
D. Historical Factors
The historical element is less clearly defined under customary
international law than political and economic requisites. It is not
entirely certain whether the term means that there exists a tradi-
tional assertion of territorial claim to the seas between islands, as
in the case of Indonesia, Fiji, and the Philippines, or in the broader
sense, that the islands have been considered traditionally as a unit,
whether or not that unit included sovereignty over inter-island
No. 31
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sea. 2 9 The latter interpretation has broader application because
the former is based on prescriptive right theory which would allow
no interruption in claim over territorial sea. Uninterrupted politi-
cal policy is rare in the South Pacific where colonial rule super-
seded native rule in most cases.
Hawaii did not escape colonialism unscathed. The difference
between Hawaii and other Pacific pockets of colonial paradise is
that Hawaii joined, rather than severed itself from the nation
which succeeded its native monarchy. O'Connell notes that in 1854
the reigning Hawaiian monarch defined the full extent of his juris-
diction to be "the waters of Hawaii and all the channels passing
between and dividing said islands from island to island and all its
ports, harbours, bays, estuaries, gulfs and arms of the sea cut off
by lines drawn from one headland to another". s0 The king was
referring here to the islands of the Main Group only; there is no
evidence of any historical claim encompassing the Leeward chain.
[T]he full extent of our jurisdiction,. . by our fundamental laws
is to the distance of one marine league surrounding each of our
islands of Hawaii, Maui, Kahoolawe, Lanai, Molokai, Oahu, Ka-
uai, and Niihau, commencing at low-water mark on each of the
respective coasts of said islands, and includes all the channels
passing between and dividing said islands from island to island
131
These claims were based on earlier assertions under Kamehameha
III: "The marine jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Islands shall also be
exclusive in all the channels passing between the respective is-
lands, and dividing them; which jurisdiction shall extend from is-
land to island".3 2 However, any marginal claims *under the monar-
chy were conceded at the Constitutional Convention, where the
channel status was discussed and it was decided that upon state-
hood Hawaii asserted no seaward claim beyond the three mile limit
extending from the low-water mark on each island.lss
At the federal level, policy has been to deny Hawaii territorial
129. Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 14, at 349-50.
130. The Kingdom's Neutrality Proclamation of 1877, O'Connell, supra note 7 at 43,
citing CROCKER, EXTENT OF THE MARGINAL SEA 595 (1919 ed.).
131. Neutrality Proclamation of King Kamehameha, May 16, 1854, cited in C.A.B. v.
Island Airlines, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 990, 998 (D. Hawaii 1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 735 (9th Cir.
1965).
132. Second Act of Kamehameha III, 1 Statute Laws of 1846, ch. VI, art. I, § I, cited in
C.A.B. v. Island Airlines, Inc., 235 F. Supp. at 997.
133. 235 F. Supp. at 1001-05.
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seas extending across the channels. A 1964 State Department
memorandum declared its position on the matter:
Each of the islands of the Hawaiian Archipelago has its own terri-
torial sea, three miles in breadth measured from low-water mark
along the coast of the island. It is our view that the waters sea-
ward of these belts of territorial sea are high seas over which no
State exercised sovereignty.134
However, at the time of that statement, neither the Geneva Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone'35 nor custom-
ary international law recognized the archipelagic baseline theory.
The emerging regime of archipelagic states has not to date changed
State Department positions.3 6
About the time Secretary of State Dean Rusk issued the above
memorandum, the courts produced a similar statement holding
that inter-island channels constitute international waters. In the
leading case, C.A.B. v. Island Airlines, 37 the question was whether
an inter-island airline ever left the state in its cross-channel over-
flight pattern, thereby becoming subject to federal regulation. In
this decision, the court held that flights crossed over international
waters mid-channel and were therefore within C.A.B. regulatory
powers. The court relied on then existing international law and
Hawaiian constitutional commentary. Since statehood, Hawaii has
asserted no channel claim. To satisfy the historical right factor,
one must look back to the claims of the monarchy superseded by a
hundred years of intervening events.
The Court found that nineteenth century monarchial claims
were inconsistent. While King Kamehameha HI claimed the chan-
nels in the Neutrality Proclamation of 1854, 13 his successor King
Kalakauau repealed prior acts of Kamehameha issuing his own
Neutrality Proclamation in 1877,139 by which "Kalakauau" appar-
ently contented himself with claiming jurisdiction over the waters
within one marine league (3-mile limit) of the low-water mark of
134. 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 281 (1963).
135. Convention of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, supra note 24.
136. The Reagan Administration has announced State Department policy regarding
UNCLOS III is under reconsideration. Malone, supra note 19, at 49-50.
137. C.A.B. v. Island Airlines, 235 F. Supp. 990 (D. Hawaii 1964), af'd, 352 F.2d 735
(9th Cir. 1965).
138. Neutrality Proclamation of 16 May 1854, cited in C.A.B. v. Island Airlines, 235 F.
Supp. at 998.
139. The Kingdom's Neutrality Proclamation of 1877, cited in C.A.B. v. Island Airlines,
235 F. Supp. at 999.
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the respective island's sea shores. '140 The Hawaiian Organic Act
makes no express mention of the channel waters. 141 At the Hawaii
State Constitutional Convention, it was decided that "[t]he words
'territorial waters' are meant to include those rightful areas as in-
curred in the Hawaiian Organic Act. . . which includes not only
the three-mile limit but the territorial waters between the named
islands. 1
42
A half century later, the Hawaii State Admissions Act, giving
the islands statehood, allowed: "The State of Hawaii shall consist
of all the islands together with their appurtenant reefs and territo-
rial waters, included in the Territory of Hawaii on the date of the
enactment of this Act. 1 43 Since "territorial waters" under interna-
tional law at the time of statehood did not include the concept of
archipelagic waters as it might today, Hawaii could not claim ex-
isting historic right.14 4
E. Summary
Of the four factors defining an archipelago, the historical posi-
tion is the weakest in Hawaii's favor. Nonetheless the other three
factors-economic, political, and geographical-provide strong
grounds for finding the Main Group an archipelago under interna-
tional law, while the Leeward Group falls short of the definitional
standard.
Analysis of the difference between an archipelago and a mere
group of islands brings out the rationale for treating the former as
a single unit. Yet at the same time it would appear that the same
reasoning could be argued on behalf of any archipelago. Indeed, at
the Caracas conferences 145 and elsewhere in the textual commenta-
ries, 1 46 authorities have argued just that.
Only the archipelagic state distinction narrows the application
of the single unit theory. Meanwhile, emerging state practice in the
Pacific is in a state of flux evidencing many inconsistencies in the
customary international law in the pre-UNCLOS III period.
140. 235 F. Supp. at 999.
141. Hawaiian Organic Act of April 30, 1900, ch. 1, § 2, 31 Stat. 141, § 339.
142. 235 F. Supp. at 1001, citing Hawaii State Constitutional Convention, 1951, Stand-
ing Committee Report 56.
143. 235 F. Supp. at 1007.
144. Id. at 1004-07.
145. Official Reports, supra note 8, at 260-73.




VI. EMERGING PRACTICE IN THE PACIFIC
After strong initial protest over the notion of a 200 mile Ex-
clusive Economic Zone, the United States followed the lead of
other coastal nations in passing domestic legislation, namely, the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 17 This was
solid recognition of the political and economic reality of evolving
state practice of other coastal nations and insular territories.
An excellent and exhaustive overview of comparative territo-
rial practice in the Pacific Basin indicates that the great majority
of archipelagos now claim a 200 mile EEZ of varying dimensions. 48
Most, however, do not claim archipelagic waters between islands.
Varying in degree of sovereignty, few are independent states, al-
though the trend continues in that direction. With a few notable
exceptions, the boundary is either expressly or impliedly measured
from normal baselines. Few groups include islands more than 400
miles apart, so that the 200 mile zone measured around each island
frequently overlaps the adjacent one, forming a single jurisdic-
tional zone. Archipelagos utilizing this model include: the Cook
Islands, the French Pacific Island Territories, New Zealand, and
Western Samoa. 4
Others assert an extended fisheries zone. The emerging pat-
tern, according to the text writers, is for the coastal state to chart
out an extended fisheries zone prefatory to the more comprehen-
sive claim of an Exclusive Economic Zone for all purposes. This is
the current status of the United States claim. Similar approaches
are taken by Chile, Japan, Micronesia, and Tuvalu.150 The 200 mile
zone of the United States applies, not only to Hawaii, but to
Guam, American Samoa, and the Pacific West Coast.
Five Pacific Island nations have asserted archipelagic state
status, setting up similar regimes of jurisdiction over archipelagic
waters: Fiji, Tonga, Philippines, Indonesia, and Papua, New
Guinea.1 51 All are sovereign states. While all five nations delimit
their waters on the basis of straight baselines under the ICNT
model, the nature of claims to those waters differs. Fiji defines for
itself an EEZ adjacent to the Territorial Sea, measured a total of
200 miles out from straight baselines. Tonga asserts claim to living
147. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976).
148. Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 14, at 550.
149. Id. at 339-49.
150. Id. at 358-62.
151. Id. at 349-51.
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and non-living resources within an archipelagic area determined by
historical criteria. The Philippines uses a hybrid of the straight
baseline method plus divergent lines satisfying historical claims to
define its extensive seaward perimeter within which it claims a
Territorial Sea. Inoonein' uses a straight baseline method to claim
archipelagic waters; twelve miles out from that it claims its Terri-
torial Sea.152
Ecuador, whose case relating to the Galapagos is most analo-
gous to Hawaii in geopolitical terms, asserts the most exclusive
claim of all, and the least likely to be recognized by the interna-
tional community. While other countries assert a narrow margin of
highly exclusive Territorial Sea around the archipelago as a whole,
or else a broad facing of less restrictive overlapping EEZ's around
each island, Ecuador combines the two methods to its enormous
advantage. It claims that "[t]he territorial sea shall also comprise
the waters within a perimeter of 200 nautical miles measured from
the outermost extremities of the outermost island of the Galapagos
(Colon) Archipelago."153
The Galapagos claim of Ecuador, asserting a 200 mile Territo-
rial Sea, is the most extreme instance of creeping jurisdiction in
the Pacific. Promulgation of regulations pertaining to foreign ves-
sels under this claim would be unduly restrictive internationally
and unenforceable domestically. Nevertheless, Ecuador has ex-
pressed in the plenary session of the Law of the Sea conferences its
unwillingness to relinquish its claim.
In viewing the total picture in the Pacific Ocean, one en-
counters vast-amounts of ocean thus nationalized on a unilateral
basis, simply expropriated from the ocean commons. Islands in
particular are responsible for the diminution of High Seas free-
dom. Instant territoriality adds, for example, four million square
miles of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to primitive French Polyne-
sia 5 and 86,000 square miles of Territorial Sea to the Philip-
pines.155 Enforcement of these limits is an astronomical task, im-
practicable for many newly independent nations. Nonetheless, this
does not seem to deter the initial assertion of EEZ claims. Many of
152. Id. at 335-50.
153. Id. at 334.
154. Veslind, Tahiti and Beyond: The Society Islands, Sisters of the Wind, 155 NA-
TIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 843, 859 (1979).
155. Rajan, Toward Codification of Archipelagos in International Law, 13 INDIAN J.
INT'L LAW 468, 469 n.13 (1973).
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the islands from which boundaries are drawn outward do not sat-
isfy the habitation and economic viability requirements of article
121, the Regime of Islands.158 Apparently, therefore, these claims
are based on the inclusion of outer islands in the archipelagic con-
stellation as a whole, even where normal baselines are applied.
Prior to the UNCLOS III treaty, in the absence of a firm rule
of international law, the tendency has been to assert some form of
EEZ which defines the archipelago as a single unit, but not yet to
delimit and assert the more restrictive characteristics of archipe-
lagic state status.
For example, Hawaii's assertion of a 200 mile Fisheries Man-
agement Zone is a conservative claim, but not inconsistent with
current practice in the Pacific. Furthermore, it has opened the pos-
sibility of expanding this to a more comprehensive Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone. In terms of its island state, federal policy has shown
care not to appear "grasping," and has conservatively declined to
assert archipelagic waters in the region.
At the same time, Hawaii would argue that the Federal Gov-
ernment should leave open to itself the option of later asserting
claims not inconsistent with evolving practice elsewhere. Hawaii,
finding itself in geographical circumstances similar to other mid-
ocean archipelagos, should be allowed the choice to assert similar
claims. The sliding scale of independence descriptive of South Pa-
cific archipelagos presents an uncertain future. Additionally, Ha-
waii would further argue the irony that, territorially at least, it
would be better off as an isolated nation than as one of the fifty
States of the Union.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Law of the Sea Treaty is of the nature of a constitution
broad enough in its terms to provide a foundation for long term
application and achieve the necessary two thirds approval of par-
ticipating delegations. A certain amount of purposeful ambiguity is
indicative of this preliminary goal in establishing a world order for
the oceans.
Negotiation of multilateral treaties has been likened to hag-
gling in a rug bazaar. The idea is-not to pick threadbare the knap
and fiber of the product before it is sold: sold, that is, in plenary
156. ICNT, supra note 1, art. 121.
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session of the United Nations conference 15 7 and sold by congres-
sional or parliamentary ratification back home. Yet, just as in a
contract for the sale of goods, consent of the parties must be predi-
cated on mutual understanding of the contract terms. Purposeful
ambiguity has limited utility.
It is clear that the delegates at the drafting sessions of the
archipelagic clauses had trouble with the meaning and the distin-
guishing particulars of "archipelagic state";15 8 it is not entirely
clear that the ambiguities have been resolved.1 59
The United States, ideally, would like to see the doctrine of
mare liberum upheld; mare clausum through creeping territoriality
imposes restrictions on freedom of the High Seas, and poses many
problems for maritime nations. As newly independent island na-
tions continue to emerge from the archipelagic clusters of colonial
Oceania and elsewhere in the South Seas, state practice could
evolve in the Pacific to produce an archipelagic regime as the stan-
dard. Hawaii would be the distinct minority as an archipelago
without archipelagic state status.
The position of the United States as a maritime state requires
careful weighing of competing considerations. Our'national secur-
ity and economic welfare depend on unrestricted overflight and
navigation through international straits and maximum access un-
impeded through sea lanes everywhere. 60 Due to the pervasiveness
of United States naval and merchant marine activity, the United
States has a compelling interest in assuring global mobility and
freedom to use the seas and the air space above them for national
security purposes. In discouraging unprecedented control over
oceans traditionally open to international traffic, the United States
consistently has set an example by limiting its own assertion of
jurisdiction over ocean space.16.
At the same time, we should not ignore the complications of
doing so. Hawaii presents the defensive aspect of the national se-
157. See E. RICHARDSON, LAW OF THE SEA: A TEST FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note
17. See also Jaenicke, supra note 3, at 438-52.
158. Official Reports, supra note 8, at 260-63.
159. Id.
160. Richardson, ed., Law of the Sea Conference and Its Aftermath, 1977 AmER. Soc.
INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 107. See also Remarks by J. Alan Beesley, Ass't Under-Sect'y of State
for External Affairs and Legal Adviser, Canada, id. at 119.
161. Currently the United States asserts a three mile Territorial Sea, a twelve mile




curity question and the protection of natural resources and eco-
nomic interests. Vulnerability characterizes insular possessions;
history has proven Hawaii to be no exception." 2 The inhabited is-
lands of the Hawaiian Archipelago require a greater measure of se-
curity precautions than does the continental coast. The greater
control afforded under the archipelagic state clauses is addressed
specifically to this special need.
Developments in the Pacific Basin in the last decade have
brought to the fore issues and conflicting interests that set mari-
time powers in opposition to newly emerging island nations.1ea The
process is incomplete; it is imlnossible to determine at the present
time the extent to which emerging archipelagic states will assert
their newly found special status under UNCLOS III.
Under the proposed treaty, the Hawaiian Islands would re-
main an archipelago without special status. Whether the United
States is prepared to accept the archipelagic state limitation is a
concern which warrants careful review of competing policies.
162. E.g., the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Dec. 7, 1941.
163. See generally Krueger and Nordquist, supra note 14.
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